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 1.  LACK OF HARMONISATION OF FAMILY LAW IN 
EUROPE AND ITS IMPACT ON RECOGNITION OF 
FOREIGN ADOPTIONS 
 Th e practice of adoption was largely viewed as a strictly national procedure for 
a long time, and as such, it was regulated by domestic rules. Th e international 
dimensions of this phenomenon have emerged as a relatively recent occurrence. 
Th ese include both the movement of children across international borders for 
adoption and the possibility of obtaining the recognition of  status fi liation is duly 
acquired abroad through adoption. As we will see, notwithstanding their cross-
border implications, these matters are only partly covered by international rules. 
Questions regarding issues such as the criteria that prospective parents should 
meet to be eligible for adoption or the legal eff ects of adoption are still mostly 
regulated by domestic legislation; States remain in fact reluctant to refrain from 
exercising their exclusive jurisdiction in family matters. 
 Even in the EU context , notwithstanding the entry into force of an 
increasing number of rules defi ning key aspects of jurisdiction, applicable law 
and recognition and the enforcement of judgments in the fi elds of divorce, 
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 1  On the harmonisation of EU private international law in family matters, see  K.  Boele-
Woelki ,  Perspectives for the Unifi cation and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe , 
 Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2003 . 
 2  It is worth recalling, even if the topic will be addressed in  section 3 , that the 2008 European 
Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised  – Strasbourg, 27.11.2008) was elaborated 
also in order to take into account developments that occurred in the European context with 
regard to adoption. It particularly highlights the need to acquire the consent of the father to 
the adoption, even in the case of children born out of wedlock (Council of Europe Treaty 
Series  – No. 202. Explanatory Report, CETS 202, Adoption of Children (Revised Convention), 
 § 27 ff .), and it also stresses the importance of considering the opinion of the child when he or 
she is considered by law as having suffi  cient understanding. Th is refl ects the emphasis placed 
at both the international and EU levels on the importance of giving the child an opportunity 
to be heard in proceedings aff ecting him or her unless such hearing is inappropriate. Finally, 
considering the legal and social developments in most CoE Member States with regard to the 
regulation of family matters, the Convention envisages the possibility of opening adoption 
to  ‘ same sex couples who are married to each other or who have entered into a registered 
partnership together ’ . It also leaves States  ‘ free to extend the scope of [the] Convention to 
diff erent sex couples and same sex couples who are living together in a stable relationship ’ . For 
more details on the Convention and, more broadly, on the regulation of adoption in Europe 
see  C.  Fenton-Glynn ,  Children ’ s Rights in Intercountry Adoption: A European Perspective , 
 Intersentia ,  Cambridge  2014 . 
maintenance obligations, parental responsibility, among others, 1 substantive 
aspects of family law are still regulated by national legislation. Th e failure to pass 
uniform rules on family issues demonstrates the cautious attitude of States in 
this regard. 
 For example, the limited number of ratifi cations alleged to the 1967 European 
Convention on the Adoption of Children , and even fewer to the revised 
version of the treaty, which was adopted in 2008 to account for legal and 
social developments in the European framework, 2 can be read as proof of the 
aforementioned reluctance of States to cede their exclusive jurisdiction in family 
matters. Th is approach is due to the continuing infl uence on family law of moral, 
religious or political beliefs, which oft en vary across States. 
 Against this background, cross-border recognition of the parental status 
arising from foreign adoptions has encountered obstacles. In some cases, orders 
duly entered into in one country may be considered contrary to the public policy 
of another country (such as in the case of adoptions pronounced in favour of 
same-sex couples). In others such orders may be recognised with diff erent  – and 
generally more limited  – eff ects than those produced in the country of origin (as 
in the case of single adoption). Furthermore, they could be deemed as not valid 
under the law, according to the confl ict-of-law rules of the concerned State (such 
as in the case of  kafalah , the alternative care option in Islamic law for children 
deprived of a family environment). 
 At the international level, the only legal instrument that addresses the 
matters under consideration is the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 , which 
Intersentia 211
Cross-Broder Recognition of Adoption
 3  Th e Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (29.05.1993). Other Conventions that are relevant in this area (such 
as the aforementioned CoE European Convention on the Adoption of Children) limit 
themselves to providing some general standards that parties should comply with to safeguard 
the child ’ s best interests; however, they do not address recognition issues, nor do they include 
confl ict-of-laws rules. 
 4  Convention on the Rights of the Child (New York, 20.11.1989), Article 3. 
 5  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Nice, 2000), Article 24. 
 6  On the child ’ s best interests principle and its relevance with regard to transnational families, 
see  M. Distefano in this volume. 
provides for the automatic recognition of intercountry adoption orders. 3 
However, notwithstanding its relevance, this treaty only covers situations when 
the parents and the child are resident in two diff erent Member States. Outside 
its scope, recognition of foreign adoptions is subject to domestic rules, with no 
legal guarantee that the situation lawfully acquired in one country and its legal 
consequences will be recognised in another. 
 Th is matter has been broadly addressed by national courts. It has also been 
the object of some relevant cases brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR ), which was called upon to pronounce on whether the lack of 
recognition of a foreign adoption violated family rights under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well as minors ’ rights. 
As stated by the 1989 UN Convention, 4 and, accordingly, by the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, 5 the child ’ s best interests should in fact be a primary 
consideration in all decisions aff ecting minors. 6 
 Assuming, also in the light of the analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
that the recognition of  status fi lii (as well as the individual status of the child) 
should be considered a means to protect family rights and pursue the best 
interests of the child, the aims of this chapter are as follows: i) to frame the 
rules aimed at regulating the recognition of foreign adoptions in the European 
context; ii) to identify (also in the light of existing practice) possible gaps in EU, 
international and national legislations regarding these matters; and iii) to assess 
how confl ict-of-law rules on the recognition of  status fi lii duly acquired abroad 
should be reshaped in light of human rights standards and social developments 
in family relationships. Th e underlying idea is that a line of continuity between 
the legal situation created in the State of origin and the domestic legal order 
should be guaranteed as a matter of principle, even if limited exceptions should 
be available to fulfi l the best interests of the child in any particular case. 
 2.  THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK: 
THE 1993 HAGUE CONVENTION AND ITS LIMITS 
 Beginning in the 1960s, the growth in international adoptions with the increasing 
number of orphan children made States aware of the need to cooperate and 
Intersentia
Chiara Ragni
212
 7  See 1993 Hague Convention, Preamble, which reproduces the idea expressed in Article 21, 
sub-paragraph (b) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 8  See Article 2 of the 1993 Hague Convention. 
 9  Notwithstanding references to adoptive parents, the possibility that intercountry adoption 
may also be pronounced in favour of a single person is clearly envisaged by Article 2 of the 
Convention. 
 10  Th is hypothesis is regulated by Article 27, which permits the receiving State to convert 
simple adoption into a full adoption, provided that the law allows it and the consents that 
are necessary for the purpose of such an adoption have been given. On this point, see 
 P. H.  Pfund ,  ‘ Intercountry Adoption: Th e 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purpose, 
Implementation, and Promise ’ , ( 1994 )  Family Law Quarterly ,  53 – 88 . 
embrace a multilateral approach to the phenomenon; their fi rst aim was to 
defi ne common shared standards to protect children against abduction, human 
traffi  cking or any other form of abuse. To that end, the Convention on the 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
was fi nally concluded at the 17th session of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law. Th e treaty, which only applies in cases where the adoptive 
parents and the child reside in diff erent Member States, aims at establishing 
 ‘ safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests 
of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognised in 
international law ’. It provides procedural standards for courts, administrative 
authorities and private intermediaries to guarantee that the best interests of the 
child principle is the guiding standard in all decisions regarding the adoption 
of minors, as is also stated by the aforementioned 1989 New York Convention . 
 Based on the premise that the best interests of minors are served by growing 
up with their own parents or at least maintaining his or her cultural, linguistic, 
religious and ethnic identity, as appropriate, the 1993 Hague Convention 
considers that adoption should be pronounced only in cases where it is the only 
means of ensuring  ‘ a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family 
cannot found in his or her State of origin ’. 7 Th e underlying idea is therefore that 
intercountry adoption should be considered a last resort and that it only serves 
the purpose of providing a family to abandoned children. 
 In line with its stated objective, the Convention does not apply to simple 
adoption and only covers adoptions that create a permanent parent-child 
relationship. 8 Single adoption might therefore be a viable option under the 
treaty, 9 provided that it is likely to produce the same legal consequence of 
creating a parentage link or where it can be converted into an adoption having 
such an eff ect in the receiving State. 10 With regard to other conditions that an 
order should fulfi l to benefi t from the Convention ’ s regime, Chapter V lists 
some procedural safeguards aimed at ensuring the protection of children ’ s rights 
against any possible abuse. 
 Like other treaties and legal instruments adopted in the fi eld of private 
international law, to ensure internal consistency and the protection of national 
fundamental principles, Article 24 provides that  ‘ the recognition of an adoption 
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 11  According to the Explanatory Report annexed to the 1993 Hague Convention:  ‘ neither 
Article 24 nor any other articles of the Convention provides for the exception of the unknown 
institution as a ground to refuse recognition of the adoption granted in a Contracting State, … 
Th us, the solution is the same and the fact that the recognizing State does not have the 
institution of adoption, or a particular form of adoption, cannot be used as a ground to deny 
recognition to foreign adoptions ’ (para. 428). 
 12  See  R.  Baratta ,  ‘ La reconnaissance internationale des situations juridiques personelles 
et familiales ’, ( 2010 )  Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law ,  348, 271 , at 
343, where the author indicates that the Convention should therefore be capable of avoiding 
 a priori the creation of limping adoptions in concerned States. 
 13  In Italy, see for example, Law No. 476 of 31.10.1998, which authorises the ratifi cation and 
implementation of the 1993 Hague Convention, as amended by Law No. 149 of 28.03.2001, 
which provides that only married couples are entitled to intercountry adoption and foreign 
decisions should comply with fundamental principles of Italian law in family matters. 
According to this rule, the well-established jurisprudence of the Italian Supreme Court 
( Corte di Cassazione ) decided that adoptions pronounced abroad in favour of single persons 
only produce in Italy the limited eff ects of the so called adoption in particular cases as 
envisaged by Article 44 of the Italian Law on adoption:  ‘ Th is approach rests on the adoption 
in particular cases being conceived as not capable of interrupting the relationship between 
the child and his/her family of origin and giving rise to parental links between the former 
and the family of the adoptive parent ’ . On this issue, see  C. E.  Tuo ,  ‘ Th e Italian Regime 
of Recognition of Intercountry Adoptions of Children in Light of the ECHR: What about 
Singles ? ’ ( 2015 )  Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional  7, 357 – 68 . On the specifi c issue of the 
recognition of foreign adoptions under the 1993 Hague Convention also see  L. Carpaneto , 
 ‘ Recognition of Protection Measures aff ecting Migrant Children ’ in  F. Ippolito and 
 G. Biagioni (eds.),  Migrant Children: Challenges for Public and Private International 
Law , 419 – 53, n 25. However, the best interests of the child principle should also take 
precedence over fundamental principles of domestic legislation, due to it being, according 
to some scholars, a limit that prevails over the public policy exception. See  F.  Mosconi and 
 C.  Campiglio ,  Diritto internazionale privato e processuale ,  II ,  Torino  2014 , p. 229. 
may be refused in a Contracting State only if the adoption is manifestly contrary 
to its public policy, taking into account the best interests of the child ’. As is further 
clarifi ed in the Explanatory Report, the specifi cation that the safeguarding 
of national interests and values should necessarily be balanced against the 
protection of the best interests of the child means that the mere existence of 
large-scale diff erences among domestic legislation with regard to the regulation 
of minors ’ adoption is not a suffi  cient ground to refuse the recognition of foreign 
decisions. 11 In addition, to affi  rm the continuity of parental bonds and thereby 
avoid limping situations, the Convention provides a preventive mechanism of 
coordination between the child ’ s State of origin and the State of destination.12  
 However, this mechanism does not preclude the possibility that adoption 
is refused to same-sex couples or to unmarried persons in accordance with 
domestic rules. According to Article 5, the eligibility requirements are in fact 
subject to national legislation and the recognition of foreign decisions might 
be denied on the grounds of their alleged contravention of the fundamental 
principles of the requested State. 13 
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 14  Even countries where the 1993 Hague Convention is in force might require additional 
conditions not provided by the treaty for the recognition of intercountry adoptions. See in 
this regard the report  ‘ 20 Years of the 1993 Hague Convention Assessing the Impact of the 
Convention on Laws and Practices Relating to Intercountry Adoption and the Protection 
of Children ’ , Preliminary Document No 3 of May 2015, drawn up by the Permanent Bureau 
for the attention of the Special Commission of June 2015 on the practical operation of the 
Hague Convention of 29.05.1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption. 
 Nonetheless, the safeguarding of national public concerns encounters a 
limitation in the need to protect the best interests of the child, which should 
take precedence over any other consideration. 
 Since the term  ‘ family ’ is not defi ned under the Convention, which only 
makes reference to spouses or persons habitually resident in a State party, the 
possibility that intercountry adoption is pronounced in favour of same-sex 
married parents is not  per se ruled out. Th e reasons why this scenario was left  
uncovered are in fact traceable to historical conditions. When the Convention 
was being draft ed from 1988 to 1993, no country allowed same-sex couples to 
adopt. Th e question was still being debated even in States such as Denmark or 
the Netherlands, which pioneered same-sex partnerships or marriages. Against 
this background, negotiators abstained from specifi cally addressing the matter, 
thus leaving States free to decide for themselves whether the intended parent 
is qualifi ed to adopt according to Article 5, if all the other conditions required 
by the treaty are fulfi lled. In the light of the Convention, what instead is more 
questionable is the eligibility of  de facto couples unless the decision concerns 
only one of the partners and/or is likely to produce the eff ects of a full adoption. 
 Beyond the discretion that States still enjoy regarding the interpretation of 
the concept of family under the Convention, a further and more important limit 
of the treaty concerns its scope of application. As anticipated above, Article 
2 postulates that for the international discipline to be applied, the intended 
parents and the adoptive child must be resident in diff erent Member States. 
Although all the EU Member States are parties to the 1993 Hague Convention, 
outside the European context, about half of the world ’ s countries have never 
ratifi ed the treaty. In such cases as well as in all the situations not covered by the 
Convention, the recognition of adoptions pronounced abroad is still entirely 
subject to domestic legislation unless bilateral agreements exist. Th us, foreign 
adoptions of children may not be recognised or may be given limited eff ects in 
the State where the parents reside, in cases when they do not meet domestic  – 
both substantive and procedural  – requirements 14 which, as well as conceptions 
of public policy, oft en vary from one country to another. 
 Under traditional methods of private international law, the recognition of 
legal parentage established abroad through adoption may prove to be hard given 
the lack of international or uniform confl ict-of-law rules. Th e application of 
traditional methods could therefore result in the spread of limping situations. 
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 15  On the impact of human rights considerations on the functioning of PIL mechanisms, see 
 R. Baratta ,  ‘ Recognition of Foreign Personal and Family Status: A Rights Based Perspective ’ 
(2016)  Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale , 413. 
 16  Th e Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in in General Assembly 
Resolution No 217 Paris on 10.12.1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/217  – III). Although the Declaration is 
not able to produce legally binding eff ects, its adoption made a fundamental contribution to the 
promotion of human rights and the adoption of treaties that are modelled on it. 
Th is means that a status, though validly acquired under one State ’ s system of 
private international law, is not recognised as valid under that of another. Such 
situations are not only undesirable but might also breach the family rights of the 
people involved. 15 
 However, the margin of discretion that States enjoy in regulating family 
matters remains subject to the limits deriving from human rights law. In this 
regard, a distinction should be traced between purely internal situations, which 
fall within the scope of domestic legislation, and cross-border relationships, 
including both intercountry adoption and situations whereby a State is required 
to recognise status acquired abroad in accordance with the national legislation 
of a diff erent country. While, as concerns the former, States are free to decide 
how to regulate the right to adopt, with regard to the latter, national values 
concerning for example the protection of traditional family must be balanced 
against the need to protect the social reality of situations already existing abroad. 
 Th is issue was brought before the ECtHR, where the refusal by national 
authorities to recognise foreign adoption orders was actually challenged on the 
ground of its incompatibility with the right to family life. 
 3.  THE RIGHT TO THE CONTINUITY OF FAMILY 
STATUS: SOCIAL REALITY AND LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATIONS v. LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 Notwithstanding their falling within the domain of domestic law, family 
relationships are also protected under international law by human rights treaties. 
For example, the 1989 New York Convention , which is focused on minors, 
emphasises both the importance of the child growing up in a family environment 
and the role played to that end by intercountry adoption (Article 21(b)). It also 
places upon party States an obligation to protect family life from any kind of 
unlawful or arbitrary interference (Article 16). Th e right of individuals to have 
their family life protected is also enshrined at the international level in many 
human rights legal instruments, starting with the 1948 UN Declaration for 
Human Rights (Articles 12 and 29(2)) 16 as well as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Article 23). In the European context, the same rights 
are protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR and by Article 7 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
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 17  In this regard the ECtHR has already explained that this right cannot be inferred from the 
Convention, in which Article 8 only protects existing relationships. Th erefore, States enjoy a 
broad margin of the discretion concerning the regulation of the requirements for adoption: 
ECtHR,  Frett è v. France ,  No. 36515/97 , 26.02.2002, ECHR 2002-I,  § 29. 
 18  ‘ It must be pointed out that the adoption orders conferred on the applicants the same 
rights and obligations in respect of their adopted children as those of a father or mother 
in respect of a child born in lawful wedlock, while at the same time ending any rights and 
obligations existing between the adopted children and their biological father or mother or 
any other person or body ’ : ECtHR,  Pini and Others v. Romania , Nos. 78028/01 and 78030/01, 
22.09.2004,  § § 140 – 142, ECHR 2004-V; the same concept was reiterated in more recent cases. 
See for example  Frett è v. France ,  § 32 and in the same vein  EB v. France , in which the Court 
insisted that  ‘ the provisions of Article 8 do not guarantee either the right to found a family or 
the right to adopt ’ [GC]  E.B. v. France ,  No. 43546/02 , 22.01.2008,  § 41. 
 19  ECtHR,  Hussin v. Belgium ,  No. 70807/01 , 06.05.2004. 
 20  ECtHR,  Wagner and J.W.M.L. v. Luxembourg, No . 76240/01, 28.06.2007, ECHR 2007-VII. 
 Th e question is whether these norms also imply an obligation for States 
to recognise family  status acquired abroad or, more specifi cally, if they also 
enshrine a right to adopt children. 
 While the right to adopt is not included, as such, among those guaranteed 
by the ECHR, 17 the relationship between the adoptive parents and the adoptee 
child is nonetheless considered to be a family tie for the purposes of Article 8. 18 
Accordingly, as it was stated for the fi rst time in  Hussin v. Belgium , the refusal 
to give eff ect to a family relation or a  status legally acquired abroad in principle 
amounts to an interference with protected rights. 19 Although the judges 
dismissed the application in the aforementioned case on the ground that the 
justifi cation given by the State for validating the refusal appeared to be well-
founded under the confl ict-of-law rules governing the competence to declare a 
foreign order enforceable, the reasoning of the Court regarding the obligations 
of State parties in matters of recognition of a family  status obtained abroad are of 
utmost importance for tracing the subsequent development of its jurisprudence 
on the matter. 
 Some years later, in  Wagner  v. Luxembourg , the Court had to pronounce on 
whether the failure of Luxembourg authorities to recognise a full adoption order 
issued by a Peruvian court in favour of a single person as valid in domestic law, 
which had been justifi ed on the grounds of its allegedly being against public 
policy, had violated Article 8 of ECHR. 20 
 Aft er explaining that  de facto  ‘ family life ’ existed between the adoptive mother 
and the child even in the absence of a legal tie resulting from the enforcement 
of the foreign order, the judges considered that the refusal to recognise the 
Peruvian decision amounted to an interference with the right to family life of 
both the adoptive mother and the child. In assessing whether the interference 
was in breach of the rights protected by the Convention, the Court followed 
a consolidated approach. It fi rst verifi ed whether the cumulative conditions 
provided by Article 8(2) were fulfi lled. According to the norm, for a domestic 
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 21  Wagner v. Luxembourg ,  § 133. 
 22  Ibid.,  § 135. 
 23  Th e same approach was taken some years later with regard to the recognition of family ties 
deriving from recourse to surrogacy. In  Paradiso Campanelli v. Italy , for example, the Court 
stated that  ‘ la r é f é rence  à l ’ ordre public ne saurait toutefois passer pour une carte blanche 
restrictive measure to be considered legitimate under the Convention, national 
authorities should demonstrate that the limitation on the relevant rights was 
in accordance with the law (or prescribed by the law) as well as necessary in a 
democratic society and proportionate to the pursuit of specifi c legitimate aims 
set out by the treaty. Insofar as family relations are concerned, these include both 
safeguards for public health and morals and the protection of the fundamental 
rights of other persons. In  Wagner v. Luxembourg , the Court fi rst noted that 
the measure had been taken by French authorities in accordance with the law, 
namely with Article 367 of the Civil Code. Th e Article limited full adoption to 
married couples based on traditional notions of child-raising by a mother and 
father. However, most European states permit adoption by unmarried persons 
without any restriction, so that it was hardly proved that the denial of full 
adoption eff ects to the Peruvian order was also strictly necessary in a democratic 
society. 
 Th e Court further indicated that in cases involving children, their best 
interests  – including the right to have the most favourable status recognised as 
well as the protection of their emotional and aff ective ties  – should prevail over 
all other considerations. It then noted that in allowing the Luxembourg confl ict-
of-law rules to take precedence over the social reality of the situation, domestic 
authorities had precluded the adoptive child and her mother from being 
aff orded legal protections granted by the law and from living their daily lives 
in the absence of insurmountable obstacles. Accordingly, the Court concluded 
that in the specifi c case at issue, the Luxembourg courts  ‘ could not reasonably 
disregard the legal status validly created abroad and corresponding to a family 
life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention ’. 21 It then reiterated its 
view of the Convention as follows: 
 a living instrument and must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions ’  … 
the Court considers that the reasons put forward by the national authorities  – namely, 
the strict application, in accordance with the Luxembourg rules on the confl ict of 
laws, of Article 367 of the Civil Code, which permits adoption only by married 
couples  – are not  ‘ suffi  cient ’ for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8. 22 
 Reference was therefore made to factual elements such as  ‘ de facto family ties ’, 
 ‘ day-by-day life ’ and  ‘ social reality ’ that should take precedence over the strict 
application of legal rules in cases when this leads to an unjustifi ed restriction of 
human rights, particularly when minors ’ interests are concerned. 23 
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justifi ant toute mesure, car l ’ obligation de prendre en compte l ’ int é r ê t sup é rieur de l ’ enfant 
incombe  à l ’ É tat ind é pendamment de la nature du lien parental, g é n é tique ou autre ’ ECtHR 
[GC],  Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy ,  No. 25358/12 , 24.01.2017,  § 80. 
 24  ECtHR,  Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece ,  No. 56759/08 , 03.05.2011. For a comment, see 
 P.  Franzina ,  ‘ Some Remarks on the Relevance of Article 8 of the ECHR to the Recognition 
of Family Status Judicially Created Abroad ’ , ( 2011 )  Diritti umani e diritto internazionale  5 , 
609 – 16. 
 25  In the same vein, see the recent Advisory Opinion, delivered upon the request of the French 
Court of Cassation, regarding the recognition in domestic law of a legal parent-child 
relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement abroad and 
the intended mother. ECtHR [GC], Advisory Opinion, No. P16-2018-001, 10.04.2019. 
 26  In this context, it has been correctly pointed out that  ‘ for this condition to be met, both formal 
and substantial standards may have to be looked at. In  Wagner and in  Negrepontis-Giannisis 
the ECtHR referred to the fact that the foreign judgments at issue had  validly created a family 
relationship in the country of origin and to the fact that each of these relationships had since 
become a  social reality ’ : P.  Franzina , above n. 24, p. 612. It should be noted however that in 
 Pini v.  Romania , the ECtHR also envisaged the possibility that family life might arise from 
a  ‘ lawful and genuine adoption order ’ , despite the absence of any aff ective ties between the 
adopters (based in Italy) and the adoptees (residing in Romania). Ibid.,  § 148. 
 Th e same approach was taken some years later in  Negrepontis-Giannissis  v. 
Greece , in which the Court considered the compatibility with Article 8 ECHR of 
the refusal of the Greek authorities to recognise an adoption order made in 1984 
by a court in the American state of Michigan in favour of the uncle of a Greek 
citizen. 24 As the adoptive father was an orthodox bishop, and as such prohibited 
under Greek canon law from carrying out secular acts, including adoption, the 
recognition was refused on public policy considerations, which according to 
the Greek Supreme Court should be understood in Greece as embodying the 
aforementioned canon rules. 
 In fi nding a violation of Article 8, the ECtHR held that the refusal did not 
answer to a pressing social need. Even in a case when there should have been a 
legitimate aim worthy of protection, the measure taken by the Greek Supreme 
Court was disproportionate, as it completely denied the  ‘ social reality ’ of a 
relationship that had existed for more than 20 years and which should have been 
properly considered. 
 Notwithstanding the diff erences between the two cases, the decisions of 
the ECtHR in  Wagner and  Negrepontis appear to point to the same conclusion. 
By making reference to factual elements or situations, the Court clarifi es that 
Article 8 requires that domestic legislation provide a possibility of recognition of 
a legal parent-child relationships established abroad regardless of their validity 
under private international law. 25 Such an obligation depends on two main 
circumstances. Th e fi rst and most important one is that the situation has been 
eff ectively created and actually exists within the legal order of a given country, 26 
and has been developed and consolidated during a signifi cant period of time, 
and the relationship has all the characteristics to be considered as a family tie for 
the purposes of Article 8. 
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 27  Wagner v. Luxembourg ,  § 130. For a more in-depth analysis of the last point see  infra ,  section 4 . 
 28  P.  Kinsch ,  ‘ Recognition in the Forum of a Status Acquired Abroad  – Private International Law 
Rules and European Human Rights Law ’ in  K.  Boele-Woelki et al. (eds.),  Convergence and 
Divergence in Private International Law  – Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr ,  Eleven International 
Publishing ,  Th e Hague  2010 , p. 259 – 75, specifcally p. 273. 
 29  In order to reach this conclusion, the Court took into consideration  ‘ the absence of 
any biological tie between the child and the intended parents, the short duration of the 
relationship with the child and the uncertainty of the ties from a legal perspective ’ : [GC], 
 Paradiso and Campanelli ,  § 157. 
 30  [GC]  Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy ,  § 199 – 211. 
 Secondly, the recognition of the status should correspond with a legitimate 
expectation of the people concerned. According to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, the concept of  ‘ legitimate expectation ’ includes both that the status was 
validly acquired abroad without recourse to fraud and that the parties could 
expect to have their relationship recognised in light of the practice followed in 
similar cases. Th is last element clearly emerges from  Wagner , in which the ECtHR 
noted that the adoptive mother acted in good faith (in reliance on a previously 
established practice of Luxembourg courts whereby Peruvian judgments 
pronouncing full adoption in favour of unmarried women were recognised by 
operation of law) and had a legitimate expectation of recognition. 27 According 
to some scholars, legitimacy also depends  ‘ upon the intensity of the links the 
situation has with the foreign legal system under which the status was acquired ’. 28 
 Th e above suggested reading of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR fi nds support 
in the reasoning made  a contrario in cases regarding surrogacy agreements, with 
particular reference to the recent decision rendered by the Grand Chamber 
in  Paradiso  and  Campanelli v. Italy . Th e refusal to recognise the relationship 
between the intended parents and the child was mainly justifi ed on the grounds 
of the illegality of the couple ’ s conduct, whereby they circumvented Italian 
legislation which expressly prohibits surrogacy, and had recourse to this practice 
in Russia. Th e Italian government moreover alleged that the relation with the 
child did not possess the characteristics of stability and continuity necessary 
for it to qualify as a family tie. Th e Court agreed with the reasons invoked by 
the State: on the one hand, it rejected the argument made by the parties that a 
family tie eff ectively existed between the intended parents and the baby; 29 on 
the other, with regard to the alleged violation of the right to private life, which 
entails both the expectation of the intended parents and the right of the child 
to have his or her status recognised, the Court considered the measure taken by 
the Italian government as legitimate and proportionate under Article 8(2) of the 
Convention. 30 
 Th e idea that seems to emerge is that no valid or legitimate expectation of the 
parties existed in this case that was likely to be perturbed and that might have 
justifi ed a diff erent conclusion. In a previous stage of the case, notwithstanding 
that it found that the measure taken by the Italian government violated Article 8 
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 31  ECtHR, Second Section, No. 25358/12,  Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy , 27.01.2015,  § 88. 
 32  See, inter alia,  L. R.  Kiestra ,  Th e Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on 
Private International Law ,  Springer ,  Th e Hague  2014 ;  J. J.  Fawcett ,  M. N.  Sh ú illeabh á in , 
and  S.  Shahm ,  Human Rights and Private International Law ,  OUP ,  Oxford  2016 ; and in this 
volume,  P. Franzina ,  ‘ Th e Place of Human Rights in the Private International Law of the 
Union in Family Matters ’ . 
 33  In this vein, see  P.  Kinsch ,  ‘ Th e impact of Human Rights on the Application of Foreign Law 
and on the Recognition of Foreign Judgments  – A Survey of the Cases Decided by European 
Human Rights Institutions ’ in  T.  Einhorn and  K.  Siehr (eds.),  Intercontinental Cooperation 
Th rough Private International Law − Essays in Memory of Peter E. Nygh ,  TMC Asser Press , 
 Th e Hague  2004 , p. 197, pp. 202 – 05; J. J  Fawcett et. al., above n. 32, p. 49. 
of the Convention, the Chamber noted that because the child had  ‘ undoubtedly 
developed emotional ties with the foster family with whom he was placed ’ aft er 
being removed from the applicants, the  ‘ fi nding of a violation in the applicants ’ 
case cannot therefore be understood as obliging the State to return the child to 
them ’. 31 In other words, and coherently with the suggested reading, the legitimate 
expectations to be safeguarded in the case were those of the foster family who 
took care of the baby and had developed an aff ective bond with him. 
 4.  RECONCILING HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 Notwithstanding that States enjoy a broad margin of appreciation concerning 
the determination of the requirements that adoptive parents should meet to 
be eligible for adoption, the above analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
reveals that when it comes to the recognition of a situation that already exists, 
domestic rules will attract close scrutiny by the Court. 
 In a situation that is dependent on foreign judgments or that was legally 
created abroad, the review of the Court on the legitimacy of the State ’ s denial to 
give it eff ect will therefore necessary imply a scrutiny of domestic confl ict-of-law 
rules. 
 Th e question of the impact of human rights on private international law is 
not a new one; for many years, both domestic courts and doctrine have explored 
viable solutions to reconcile these two areas of law. 32 States enjoy broad discretion 
in the regulation of private international law, particularly in the fi eld of family 
law, as noted above. Th e exercise of such discretion cannot override the limits 
imposed by human rights standards and obligations. A compromise between 
the two areas must therefore be achieved in situations susceptible to a potential 
confl ict between them. 33 
 Such a compromise should be reached by starting from the assumption that 
private international law and human rights rules somehow pursue similar goals. 
Ensuring the cross-border continuity of a person ’ s rights and status is one of 
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 34  In this vein, see  Fawcett et al., above n. 32. 
 35  P. Kinsch , above n. 28, p. 266. 
 36  ECtHR,  Harroudj v. France , No. 43631/09, 04.10.2012. 
 37  On matters regarding the recognition of  kafalah in European Countries, see A.  Lang in this 
volume. 
 38  Th e decision was criticised on the grounds of the deference that the Court  ‘ accords to legal 
formalism and to the use of rigid juridical  ‘ nationality ’ as a connecting factor in regulating a 
child ’ s personal status ’ : J. J.  Fawcett et al., above n. 31, p. 775. More generally, on the balance 
between the need for safeguarding cultural interests and the need to grant a secure parent-
child relationship, see  E.  Bartholet ,  ‘ International Adoption: Th oughts on the Human 
Rights Issues ’ , ( 2007 )  Buff alo Human Rights Law Review  13, 180, 191 – 92 . 
the purposes of confl ict-of-law rules , which  – as suggested in this book  – aim 
at creating bridges between legal orders and serve as a means of safeguarding 
family rights under Article 8. 34 Th e jurisprudence of the ECtHR should not 
be read as if it points to the  ‘ indiscriminate displacement of confl ict of laws 
rules ’ ; 35 rather, the idea that emerges is that a strictly formalistic approach to the 
question of the recognition of family  status acquired abroad should be set aside 
in cases when it results in the complete frustration of legitimate expectations 
of the persons concerned, with a special regard to situations in which a child ’ s 
interests are at stake. A right balance of all the concerned interests cannot be 
struck but on a case-by-case basis. 
 An analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR moreover suggests that 
private international law might also synergistically contribute to human rights 
protection. For example, in  Harroudi v. France , the Court was called upon 
to pronounce on the question of whether a French choice-of-law rule giving 
eff ect to a prohibition on adoption of the child under the national law was 
compatible with Article 8. 36 Specifi cally, the applicant complained of the refusal 
of domestic courts to grant her a full adoption of an Algerian child that she had 
taken into her legal care three years previously by way of the Islamic institution 
of  kafalah . 37 Th e refusal was justifi ed on the grounds of the provisions of the 
French Civil Code, which prohibit full adoption of children in cases where such 
is not provided by their national law. 
 On the premise that French law provides the means to alleviate the eff ects 
of that prohibition, the Court concluded that  ‘ the respondent State, which seeks 
to encourage the integration of children of foreign origin without cutting them 
off  immediately from the rules of their country of origin, has shown respect for 
cultural pluralism and has struck a fair balance between the public interest and 
that of the applicant ’. In other words, the choice-of-law rule under question was 
regarded as a means of protecting cultural rights while simultaneously providing 
the child with the possibility of enjoying similar protections to those accorded 
by the law to adoptive children. 38 
 Even if they do not specifi cally address adoption, it is worth mentioning that 
in other cases the Court considered that human rights law and confl ict-of-law 
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 39  On this issue see in this volume, R.  Lamont . 
 40  Th e 1967 Convention did not take a strong position on the child ’ s consent to an adoption (see 
Articles 5 and 9(9)(f)). Th e right of the child to be heard is rather protected by all international 
treaties concerning children ’ s rights: see Article 12 of the 1989 New York Convention; Article 3(b) 
of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children ’ s Rights (1996, ETS No. 160); 
Article 4(d) of the 1993 Hague Convention on Inter-Country Adoption; Article 13 of the 
1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction; Article 23 of 
the Convention of 19.10.1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement 
and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of 
Children. Within the EU context, also see Article 24(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU (2012/C 326/02) and Article 11(2) of the Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 (see, in this 
volume, L.  Carpaneto ). 
rules can work together towards the same purpose. For example, in most cases 
regarding child abduction, the return of the child, which is the main object of 
the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction , was considered as 
being the means of ensuring the maintenance of family ties with both parents, as 
well as (more broadly) of responding to the general public interest of protecting 
the best interests of children, by discouraging future kidnapping. 39 
 Also in the case of adoption, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR clearly indicates 
that human rights law and private international law can support each other in 
the pursuit of common objectives. Fundamental rights are at the heart of all 
international rules dealing with international adoption, which are aimed at 
ensuring that this practice shall never be used as a means of perpetrating human 
traffi  cking , abduction, or other forms of exploitation. Accordingly, starting 
from the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, international 
rules require that the recognition of adoption orders is subject to a procedure 
that ensures minors ’ protection against all possible forms of abuse with a 
view to granting children the possibility of growing up in a wholesome family 
environment. Moreover, as indicated in the 2008 European Convention on 
the Adoption of Children , international rules also insist on the importance of 
perceiving adoption as a last resort for resolving cases whereby there are no 
alternative options for providing a child with a family. In accordance with the 
goals pursued, international rules also recognise the need to seek the opinion 
of the child of a suffi  cient age and maturity, 40 as well as the necessity that the 
adoption order is pronounced by a competent entrusted authority acting in 
compliance of fundamental procedural safeguards. 
 Th e promotion of minors ’ best interests, which is a shared goal of both human 
rights and private international law, not only requires that they be granted 
protection against abuses, but also the right to have their family ties recognised 
and protected by the State. Th is does not necessarily postulate an obligation to 
recognise all of the legal eff ects of adoption orders. Rather, it points to a duty to 
ensure that the child is not deprived of family situations or relationships duly 
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established abroad that contribute to the development of his/her personality. 
Th e refusal to recognise an existing parent-child link arising from a foreign 
adoption should be pronounced only aft er a careful assessment of the situation. 
Furthermore, the impact of restrictive national measures on the right of children 
to have their identity guaranteed must be assessed, in addition to the legitimate 
expectation that the social reality of their emotional bonds is safeguarded. As 
was recently pointed out by the ECtHR in its Advisory Opinion of 10 April 2019: 
 ‘ Article 8 of the Convention does not impose a general obligation on States to 
recognise  ab initio a parent-child relationship  … What the child ’ s best interests  – 
which must be assessed primarily  in concreto rather than  in abstracto  – require 
is for recognition of that relationship, legally established abroad, to be possible 
at the latest when it has become a practical reality. It is in principle not for the 
Court but fi rst and foremost for the national authorities to assess whether and 
when, in the concrete circumstances of the case, the said relationship has become 
a practical reality ’ ( ivi , para. 52). 41 
 A human rights-based attitude to private international law should therefore 
necessarily imply rethinking traditional methods based on strict applications 
of confl ict-of-law rules in favour of a more fl exible approach to the recognition 
of  status acquired abroad. 42 As suggested by the relevant literature, to settle 
possible normative confl icts, private international law  ‘ should be shaped and 
understood as a means to pursue the fundamental rights of the individuals 
concerned ’. 43 Positive obligations descending from human rights treaties and 
Article 8 ECHR do not in fact entail a general duty for the State to remove all 
obstacles to recognition, but rather an obligation to  ‘ forge its PIL provisions so 
as to make them  result-oriented ’. 44 Th is means that domestic legislation should 
be able to ensure that, far from being the results of an automatic and rigid 
application of internal rules, decisions on recognition should be the results of a 
careful assessment of all the interests involved. 
 
 41  Above n. 25. 
 42  It has been correctly suggested in this regard that, according to this approach, public policy 
could be for example conceived  – and applied  – as a means of providing private international 
law with the inherent fl exibility to ensure the protection of human rights:  F. Salerno , 
 ‘ Il vincolo al rispetto dei diritti dell ’ uomo nel sistema delle fonti del diritto internazionale 
privato ’ , (2014)  Diritti umani e diritto internazionale , 549. 
 43  In this context, see R.  Baratta , above n. 15, p. 426 ff . 
 44  Ibid.; for an assessment of possible solutions, see  P. Lagarde ,  ‘ La reconnaissance, mode 
d ’ emploi ’ in  Vers de noveaux  é quilibres entre ordre juridiques, Liber Amicorum H é l é ne 
Guaudemet-Tallon , Paris, Dalloz 2008, p. 481;  I.  Thoma ,  ‘ Th e ECHR and the  Ordre Public 
Exception in Private International Law ’ , ( 2011 )  Netherlands International Privaatrecht 
(NIPR) ,  13 ;  P. Kinsch , above n. 27, 273 ff . 

